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We embed an expectations-based optimal policy rule into a DSGE model for a 
small open economy that is augmented with trend extrapolation or chartism, 
which is a form of technical trading, in currency trade to examine the prerequisites 
for monetary policy. We find that a unique REE that is least-squares learnable is 
often the outcome when there is a limited amount of trend extrapolation, but that a 
less flexible inflation rate targeting may cause a multiplicity of REE. We also 
compute impulse-response functions for key macroeconomic variables to study 
how the economy returns to steady state after being hit by a shock. 
 
Keywords: determinacy, DSGE model, least-squares learning, targeting rule, 
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Heterogeeniset valuuttakurssiodotukset, optimaalinen 
rahapolitiikka ja talouden tasapainot 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 21/2007 
Mikael Bask 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan rahapolitiikan toimintaedellytyksiä pienessä avoi-
messa taloudessa. Työssä käytettyä pienen avotalouden dynaamista stokastista 
yleisen tasapainon mallia täydennetään rahapolitiikan korkosäännöllä, jonka mu-
kaan keskuspankki muuttaa ohjauskorkoaan, kun se ennakoi välittömien inflaatio-
paineiden tai kustannuspaineiden voimistuvan tulevaisuudessa. Näin mallinnetun 
rahapolitiikan lisäksi työn teoreettinen malli poikkeaa kauttaaltaan rationaalisten 
odotusten mallista yhtäältä olettamalla, että osa valuuttamarkkinatoimijoista pe-
rustaa hinnoittelunsa ja kaupankäyntinsä tekniseen analyysiin. Toisaalta muiden 
taloudenpitäjien odotustenmuodostus tai oikeastaan ennusteiden laadinta perustuu 
talouden havaittuun liikelakiin, jota kuvataan tilastollisella mallilla. Mallin 
kerroinestimaatit päivitetään jokaisena periodina estimoimalla ne tuoreesta tilasto-
aineistosta. Näistä oletuksista seuraa erityisesti, että valuuttamarkkinoiden 
odotustenmuodostus on heterogeenista ja että mallitalouden dynaaminen tasa-
paino poikkeaa rationaalisten odotusten dynaamisesta tasapainosta. Tässä tutki-
muksessa tarkastellaan kuitenkin, onko rationaalisten odotusten tasapaino opitta-
vissa eli yhtäläistyvätkö taloudenpitäjien tilastolliset ja rationaalisten odotusten 
ennusteet ja miten teknisen kaupankäynnin levinneisyys valuuttamarkkinoilla 
vaikuttaa opittavuuteen. Tulosten mukaan yksikäsitteinen rationaalisten odotusten 
tasapaino on opittavissa, kun tekninen kaupankäynti on vähäistä. Toisaalta 
keskuspankin inflaatiovastaisuuden voimistuminen mahdollistaa useita ratio-
naalisten odotusten tasapainoja. Työssä tarkastellaan myös keskeisten makro-
taloudellisten muuttujien dynaamista sopeutumista pitkän aikavälin tasapainoon 
taloutta kohdanneen häiriön jälkeen. 
  
Avainsanat: määrittyneisyys, DSGE-malli, pienimmän neliösumman oppiminen, 
tavoitesääntö, tekninen kaupankäynti, rahapolitiikka 
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In 1993, Taylor (1993) demonstrated that Federal Reserve’s policy could be
described by the following interest rate rule
rt =0 .04 + 1.5(πt − 0.02) + 0.5(yt − y) (1.1)
where rt is Federal Reserve’s operating target for the funds rate, πt is the
inﬂation rate according to the GDP deﬂator, yt is the logarithm of real GDP,
and y is the logarithm of potential real GDP. In particular, the rule in (1.1)
prescribes setting the funds rate in response to the inﬂation rate and the output
gap, where the latter is the diﬀerence between the two measures of GDP. Taylor
(1999) also argues that since this rule describes Federal Reserve’s policy during
a successful period, one should adopt a rule like this in policy-making.1
Instrument or targeting rule?
Svensson (2002)—(2003) argues vividly that an instrument rule such as the
Taylor rule in (1.1) is inferior to a targeting rule in policy-making since the
instrument rule is not consistent with an optimizing behavior on the part
of the central bank. The targeting rule, on the other hand, is derived from
the optimization of an objective function. Thus, in a typical DSGE model
that often is utilized when embedding an interest rate rule into a theoretical
framework, all agents in the economy behave optimally; households maximize
utility, ﬁrms maximize proﬁt, and the central bank maximizes welfare (see
Woodford, 2003).
L e tu su s eS v e n s s o n ’ s( 2 0 0 3 )o w nw o r d st om a k et h ep o i n tc l e a r :
‘Monetary policy by the world’s more advanced central banks
these days is at least as optimizing and forward-looking as the
behavior of the most rational private agents. I ﬁnd it strange
that a large part of the literature on monetary policy still prefers
to represent central bank behavior with the help of mechanical
instrument rules.’ (p. 429).
For this reason, we focus on a targeting rule, or an optimal police rule, in this
paper.
A unique REE that is learnable?
Typically, in the literature, conditions for uniqueness of the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) are examined since the policy-maker would
like to avoid coordination problems in the economy. For instance, without
imposing additional restrictions into a rational expectations model, it may not
be known in advance which REE that agents will coordinate on, if there will be
1 See Clarida et al (1999) for an early review of interest rate rules in dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, and Zimmermann (2003) for a more introductory text
on the same topic. Woodford’s (2003) seminal work on rules in policy-making should also
be part of the reading list.
7any coordination at all. To give an example, the eﬀects of changes in monetary
policy may not be known beforehand: is it the case that agents will coordinate
on a REE that has undesirable properties, like a very high inﬂation rate, or
on a REE in which the price level is stable?
Another problem is the actual computations of the time-paths of economic
v a r i a b l e sw h e na g e n t sh a v er a t i o n a le x p e c t a t i o n ss i n c eo n ec a n n o te x p e c tt h a t
they have perfect knowledge of the economy’s law of motion. For example, it
is a well-known fact among economists that the transmission mechanism for
monetary policy has a complicated structure, and this also means that there
are disagreements about the exact nature of this mechanism. The following
question arises, however: may agents eventually learn the REE, if they can
make use of data generated by the economy itself to improve their knowledge
of its law of motion?
The concept of learning that we make use of in this paper is least squares
learning, and to have a REE that is least squares learnable, the parameter
values in the perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy have to converge
to the economy’s actual law of motion (ALM), and this happens when the
REE is characterized by expectational stability (ie, E-stability). Thus, this
t o o li sn o to n l ya b l et os i n g l eo u tt h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gR E Ei nam o d e l ,i t
a l s oa c k n o w l e d g e st h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t sm a yn o tb ee q u i p p e dw i t hap e r f e c t
knowledge of the economy’s law of motion. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
for an introduction to this literature, and Bullard (2006) for a review of interest
rate rules in DSGE models from a learning perspective.
Heterogeneity in currency trade
Questionnaire surveys made at currency markets around the world reveal that
currency trade to a large extent not only is determined by an economy’s
performance or expected performance. Indeed, a fraction is guided by technical
trading, meaning that past exchange rates are assumed to provide information
about future exchange rate movements. A simple example of technical trading
is trend following.
See Oberlechner (2004) for an in-depth discussion of two large questionnaire
surveys conducted at the European and the North American markets, Gehrig
and Menkhoﬀ (2006) for a survey on trading behavior that includes references
to several other surveys made at currency markets (eg, Cheung and Chinn,
2001, Lui and Mole, 1998, Menkhoﬀ, 1997, Oberlechner, 2001, and Taylor
and Allen, 1992), and Neely (1997) for a layman’s guide on technical trading.
Notice that other terms for technical trading are chartism and technical
analysis.
Aim of the paper
We embed an optimal policy rule into Galí and Monacelli’s (2005) DSGE
model for a small open economy that is augmented with trend following in
currency trade to examine the prerequisites for monetary policy. Speciﬁcally,
the conditions for a unique REE that is least squares learnable are in focus.
We also compute impulse-response functions for key variables in the model to
study how the economy returns to steady state after being hit by a shock.
8Relation to the literature
Since an optimal policy rule in the form of an expectations-based rule is derived
(that we discuss what it is in Section 3), the present paper relates to Evans
and Honkapohja (2003a)—(2006) who, from a learning perspective, examine the
desirability of expectations-based rules in a DSGE model for a closed economy.
Two recent papers that also focus on the learnability of a unique REE, but
f o ra no p e ne c o n o m y ,a r eB u l l a r da n dS c h a l i n g( 2 0 0 6 )a n dL l o s aa n dT u e s t a
(2006). The former paper examines optimal policy in a two-country model,
whereas the latter paper examines instrument rules in the same DSGE model
as in this paper. However, there is no technical trading in Llosa and Tuesta
(2006) nor in the other papers.2
Outline of the paper
The model we examine is outlined in the next section. Thereafter, in Section 3,
we derive the optimal policy rule for the central bank, whereas the conditions
for a determinate and E-stable REE are in focus in Section 4. Impulse-response
functions for key variables are computed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes
the paper with a short discussion.
2D S G E m o d e l
A DSGE model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities is presented
in Galí and Monacelli (2005) for a small open economy, and their model consists











































where xt is the output gap, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the CPI
inﬂation rate, et is the nominal exchange rate, and rrt is the natural rate
of interest. The superscripts e and e,m denote expectations in general and
market expectations in currency trade, respectively, and an asterisk in the
superscript denotes a foreign quantity. See the Appendix for the derivation of
(2.1)—(2.2) using equations in Galí and Monacelli (2005).
β ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor that is used when the representative
household in the home country maximizes a discounted sum of instantaneous
2 See Hommes (2006) for a survey of the literature on heterogeneous agent models in
economics and ﬁnance, and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) for an introduction to exchange
rate determination in a behavioral ﬁnance framework.
9utilities derived from consumption and leisure, δ ∈ [0,1] is the share of
consumption in the home country allocated to imported goods, meaning that δ
is an index of openness of the economy, and α and γ are functions of parameters
in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model.3
There are two types of behavior in currency trade: (i) trend following; and
(ii) trading that is based on fundamental analysis. When trend following is
used, it is believed that the exchange rate will increase between time periods t
and t+1, if it increased between time periods t−1 and t.4,5 When fundamental
analysis is used, agents have rational expectations regarding the next time






t+1 +( 1− ω)∆e
e,f
t+1 = ω∆et +( 1− ω)∆e
e
t+1 (2.4)
where ω ∈ [0,1] is the degree of trend following in currency trade, and e,c
and e,f denote expectations according to chartism and fundamental analysis,
respectively. Even though the superscript e denotes rational expectations,
we also think of it as non-rational expectations when focusing on learning in
Section 4.
3 Optimal monetary policy
The model is now closed by deriving an interest rate rule for the central bank






3 α depends on the openness index, δ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in
consumption, and the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods in consumption; and
γ depends on α, the discount factor, β, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor
supply, and the share of ﬁrms that set new prices in each time period (see Calvo, 1983).
4 To minimize the number of structural parameters in the model, these two consecutive
increases in the exchange rate are of the same size.
5 More sophisticated trading rules, like the moving averages (MA) technique, could also
be desirable to examine in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model. However, this would
complicate the analysis considerably, and it is not certain that the dynamics is aﬀected that
much compared to when simple trend following is used in currency trade. This conclusion
comes from the asset pricing model in Bask (2006), where it was found that the exchange
rate in time periods t − t0, t0 ≥ 2, had a second-order eﬀect on the current exchange rate,
whereas the exchange rate in the previous time period had a ﬁrst-order eﬀect. However, see
Bask (2007a) for the MA technique in a Dornbusch-style model.
10given the economy’s law of motion in (2.1)—(2.4). Thus, we assume that there
is no commitment mechanism available for the central bank, meaning that the
optimal policy rule is derived under discretion in policy-making. Then, the
optimization problem for the central bank is6
min
xt,πt
























· πt = Aπt (3.3)
Be aware that the central bank controls the exchange rate change when
optimizing the objective function in (3.1), even though this variable does not
appear explicitly in the optimization problem in (3.2). The objective function
in (3.1) is often referred to as ﬂexible inﬂation rate targeting, where ζ =0
is strict targeting, and the condition in (3.3) is often referred to as a speciﬁc
targeting rule.
As already stated in the literature, there is no unique way in which a
condition for optimal policy can be implemented by the central bank as an
i n t e r e s tr a t er u l e . I ti s ,h o w e v e r ,s h o w ni nE v a n sa n dH o n k a p o h j a( 2 0 0 3 b )
that a fundamentals-based rule in a DSGE model for a closed economy
is not associated with stability under learning. On the other hand, an
expectations-based rule gives rise to this property of the economy since it
is designed for this task.
For the sake of the argument, assume that the economy is in the
neighborhood of a REE. Since a fundamentals-based rule is derived under
the assumption that the economy is in the REE, there is no mechanism
that corrects agents’ private expectations. On the other hand, an
expectations-based rule does not assume rational expectations. Instead, the
interest rate set by the central bank is directly inﬂuenced by agents’ private
expectations, meaning that there is now a mechanism that may correct their
expectations in such a way that the economy converges to the REE.
Therefore, after combing the economy’s law of motion in (2.1)—(2.3) with
the condition in (3.3), and not assuming that agents have rational expectations,
we have the following optimal interest rate rule7
6 Firstly, replace ∆e
e,m
t+1 in (2.1)—(2.3) with the expression in (2.4). Secondly, neglect from
constants and variables dated at time t+1in the equations. Thirdly, replace rt in (2.1) with
the expression in (2.3). Finally, solve (2.1) for ∆et, substitute this expression into (2.2), and
the constraint is derived.
7 Firstly, replace ∆e
e,m
t+1 in (2.1)—(2.2) with the expression in (2.3). Secondly, replace xt in
(2.1)—(2.2) with the optimality condition in (3.3). Thirdly, solve (2.2) for πt, and substitute
this expression into (2.1). Finally, solve (2.1) for rt, and the rule is derived.




t+1 + κ∆e∆et (3.4)
where8
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











Notice that the interest rate set by the central bank depends on the current
exchange rate change, and not the expected exchange rate change.
4 A determinate and E-stable REE?
Let us now examine under what conditions the economy is characterized by
a unique REE that is least squares learnable. To determine if the complete
model has a unique REE, the number of predetermined variables is compared
with the number of eigenvalues of a certain matrix that are outside the unit
circle (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). If there is a unique REE, we also
know that it is E-stable since the dating of expectations is time-t in our model
(see McCallum, 2007). Therefore, since E-stability is closely related to least
squares learning, all determinacy regions found below are also regions for a
unique REE that is least squares learnable.
T h ec o m p l e t em o d e li nm a t r i xf o r mi s
Γ · yt = Θ · y
e























0 β −βδ(1 − ω)0
00 1 − ω 0
κx κπ 00
⎤




yt =[ xt,πt,∆et,r t]
0 (4.4)





9 The ﬁrst row is (2.4) substituted into (2.1), the second row is (2.4) substituted into
(2.2), the third row is (2.4) substituted into (2.3), and the fourth row is (3.4).
12T h ee x a c tf o r mo ft h em a t r i c e sΛ and Ξ does not matter when examining
whether the model has a unique and learnable REE. Then, since there is one
variable that is predetermined, rt, exactly one eigenvalue of the matrix Γ−1·Θ
m u s tb eo u t s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l et oh a v ead e t e r m i n a t eR E E . 10 However, if more
than one eigenvalue are outside the unit circle, we have an indeterminate REE,
and if all eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, there is no stable REE.
However, deriving analytical conditions for determinacy is not meaningful
for practical reasons since these expressions would be too large and
cumbersome to interpret. Consequently, we adopt the same strategy as in
other papers within this area and illustrate our ﬁndings for determinacy
using calibrated values of the structural parameters. Therefore, the following
parameter values are used in the analysis that are based on quarterly data:
©
α = 1
0.157,β =0 .99,γ =0 .024,δ =0 .2, 0.4 (4.5)
See Woodford (1999) for the closed economy parameters α, β and γ.M o r e o v e r ,
when the index of openness of the economy is δ =0 .2, the index is slightly
larger than the import/GDP ratio in the US, and when the index of openness
is δ =0 .4, which is the parameter setting in Galí and Monacelli (2005), the
index corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio in Canada. We also use an
alternative calibration in the analysis, where the closed economy parameters
in Clarida et al (2000) are used11
©
α =1 ,β =0 .99,γ =0 .3,δ =0 .2, 0.4 (4.6)
Thus, the diﬀerences in α and γ in the two settings are quite large, and our
focus below is on the ﬁndings when the parameters in (4.5) are used since this
setting is more common in the literature.
See Figure 1 for regions in the (ω,ζ)-space that are associated with a
determinate and E-stable REE, an indeterminate REE and no stable REE
when the openness of the economy is δ =0 .4, and the Woodford (1999)
parameters are used.
10 It is not always self-evident which variables in a model that are predetermined. However,
by looking at the entries in the relevant matrix, Γ−1·Θ =
⎡







⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,w ec a n
conclude that rt is predetermined, and this is because there are predetermined relationships
between current and expected values of xt, πt and ∆et (see the ﬁrst three rows in the
matrix), and that rt only depends on the expected values of the same variables and not the
expected value of itself (see the fourth row in the matrix).
11 Clarida et al (2000) estimate diﬀerent interest rate rules to evaluate Federal Reserve’s
policy during 1960—1996 using a DSGE model, and they found that the policy during the
Volcker-Greenspan period was more successful to stabilize the economy than the policy
during the pre-Volcker period. Even though their evaluation of Federal Reserve’s policy is
somewhat simplistic, it is very intriguing.
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Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and
regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)
Figure 1. The openness of the economy is 40 per cent (Woodford)
Not surprisingly, when the degree of trend following in currency trade is
large, there is no stable REE in the economy, and this is because there is
no mechanism in technical trading that forces the economy to equilibrium.
Moreover, when there is no trend following in currency trade, there is a unique
REE that is least squares learnable, and this result is not either surprising since
Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) show that a DSGE model for a closed economy
has these properties when the central bank is using an expectations-based rule
in optimal policy-making. Recall that the optimal policy problem in a small
open economy is isomorphic to the problem in a closed economy (see Clarida
et al, 2001).
When the amount of trend following in currency trade is more limited, there
is either a unique or a multiplicity of REE in the economy. However, when
inﬂation rate targeting is strict, or almost strict, there is always a determinate
and E-stable REE. This is interesting since a qualiﬁed guess is that almost
strict inﬂation rate targeting is optimal, even though we do not derive the
optimal degree of targeting in this paper (since we have not established the
exact relationship between the representative household’s utility function and
the objective function that the central bank is optimizing).12
In Figure 2, we show the same regions in the (ω,ζ)-space as in Figure 1,
but the openness of the economy is now δ =0 .2.
12 Woodford (2003) has looked into this matter in a DSGE model and ﬁnd that almost
strict inﬂation rate targeting is optimal (ζ =0 .048).
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Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and
regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)
Figure 2. The openness of the economy is 20 per cent (Woodford)
We have the same ﬁndings as when the economy is more open, but there are, of
course, quantitative diﬀerences. First, the maximum amount of trend following
in currency trade to have a stable economy is somewhat larger in this case.
The reason is that exchange rate movements, which may have a destabilizing
eﬀect on the economy due to technical trading, have a more limited eﬀect when
the economy is less open. Also, the region in the (ω,ζ)-space for a unique REE
that is least squares learnable is larger, even though it is more likely to have an
indeterminate REE when inﬂation rate targeting is more strict (eg, ζ<0.1).
Unfortunately, it is not easy to give an economic intuition to the latter ﬁnding.
In Figures 3—4, we show the same regions in the (ω,ζ)-space as in Figures
1—2, but the Clarida et al (2000) parameters are now used.
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Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and
region when there is no stable REE (see white area)
Figure 3. The openness of the economy is 40 per cent (Clarida et al)
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Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and
regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)
Figure 4. The openness of the economy is 20 per cent (Clarida et al)
16A g a i n ,w h e nt h ed e g r e eo ft r e n df o l l o w i ng in currency trade is large, there is
no stable REE in the economy, but the diﬀerence is now that this region in
the (ω,ζ)-space is somewhat smaller. A qualitative diﬀerence between the two
parameter settings, however, which applies when the openness of the economy
is δ =0 .4, is that there is always a unique REE in the economy when it is
stable. Thus, there is no indeterminacy problem in the economy.
5 Impulse-response functions
Having established under what conditions the economy is characterized by
a unique REE that is least squares learnable, we now shift focus to the
computation of impulse-response functions for key variables. For this reason,
we have to specify how the shock (impulse) hits the economy, and we assume
that it is channeled through the natural rate of interest. Speciﬁcally, in time
period t =1 , a shock is hitting the economy such that ∆rr1 =1 .13 Thereafter,
when there is a unique and stable REE, the economy returns to steady state,
and depending on the parameter setting in the economy, the convergence is
fast or slow as well as oscillating or non-oscillating.
In Figures 5—7, impulse-response (IR) functions for the output gap, the CPI
inﬂation rate, the nominal exchange rate change and the nominal interest rate
are shown when the openness of the economy is δ =0 .4, and the Woodford
(1999) parameters are used.




t =0in all computations in this section. Also, rr0 =0 .


































Nominal exchange rate change











Figure 5. IR functions when 10 per cent chartism and strict
targeting (Woodford)































Nominal exchange rate change










Figure 6. IR functions when 35 per cent chartism and strict
targeting (Woodford)






























Nominal exchange rate change










Figure 7. IR functions when 35 per cent chartism and ﬂexible
targeting (Woodford)
In Figure 5, there is a small amount of trend following in currency trade
(ω =0 .1)a n di n ﬂation rate targeting is almost strict (ζ =0 .05)w i t ht h ee ﬀect
that the economy’s adjustment path to steady state is fast and non-oscillating.
In Figure 6, when a larger amount of trend following is used in currency trade
(ω =0 .35), the adjustment path is still non-oscillating, but, on the other
hand, the return of the economy to steady state is very slow. In Figure 7,
when inﬂation rate targeting is more ﬂexible (ζ =0 .5)a n dt h es a m ea m o u n t
of trend following is used in currency trade (ω =0 .35), the adjustment path
to steady state is again faster but now oscillating.
Obviously, the shock’s eﬀect on the output gap is smaller when inﬂation rate
targeting is more ﬂexible, and this also means that the eﬀect on the inﬂation
rate is allowed to be larger by the central bank. That the return of the economy
to steady state is very slow in one case is not easy to give an economic intuition
to, especially since the parametrizations of the optimal policy rule are not very
19diﬀerent in the three cases: rt = const. +0 .129xe
t+1 +0 .452πe
t+1 − 0.369∆et,
rt = const. +0 .098xe
t+1 +0 .934πe
t+1 − 0.045∆et and rt = const. +0 .095xe
t+1 +
0.994πe
t+1 −0.004∆et, respectively.14,15 Notice that the Taylor principle is not
satisﬁed in any of the rules (ie, κπ ≯ 1), even though the economy returns to
steady state in each case, and that it is optimal for the central bank to ‘lean
with the wind’ to exchange rate changes.
Impulse-response functions for the same variables are shown in Figures
8—10 when the openness of the economy is δ =0 .4, but now are the Clarida et
al (2000) parameters used.
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Figure 8. IR functions when 10 per cent chartism and strict
targeting (Clarida et al)
14 We also observe that the very slow return of the economy to steady state is even slower
when the amount of trend following in currency trade approaches the limit to have a unique
and stable REE. (This is not shown graphically in the paper.)
15 That the economy oscillates back to steady state in one case is due to the fact that
there are imaginary roots to the characteristic equation that describes the economy’s law of
motion. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the economy must be oscillating by just
looking at the parametrization of the optimal policy rule.
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Figure 9. IR functions when 50 per cent chartism and strict
targeting (Clarida et al)
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Figure 10. IR functions when 50 per cent chartism and ﬂexible
targeting (Clarida et al)
21Roughly speaking, the assumptions behind Figures 5 and 8, Figures 6 and 9,
and Figures 7 and 10 are the same, even though a somewhat larger amount
of trend following in currency trade is allowed for in Figures 9—10 (ω =0 .5).
Again, the return of the economy to steady state is very slow in one case, but
it is never oscillating in the cases examined. Also, the shock’s eﬀect on the
output gap is smaller and its eﬀect on the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sl a r g e rw h e ni n ﬂation
rate targeting is more ﬂexible.
Turning to the parametrizations of the optimal policy rule, they are now
rt = const. +0 .237xe
t+1 +1 .908πe
t+1 +0 .612∆et, rt = const. +0 .972xe
t+1 +
0.071πe
t+1 − 0.626∆et and rt = const. +0 .619xe
t+1 +0 .953πe
t+1 − 0.032∆et,
respectively. Notice that the Taylor principle is satisﬁed in the ﬁr s tr u l e( i e ,
κπ > 1), which corresponds to the case in which the economy’s adjustment
path to steady state is the fastest (of all six cases examined). Moreover,
with the exception of the ﬁrst rule, it is again optimal for the central bank
to ‘lean with the wind’ to exchange rate changes. It is also worth noting
that the parametrizations of the optimal policy rule are not that similar when
the Clarida et al (2000) parameters are used as when the Woodford (1999)
parameters were in focus.
6 Discussion
We have embedded an expectations-based optimal policy rule into Galí
and Monacelli’s (2005) DSGE model for a small open economy that has
been augmented with trend following in currency trade to examine the
prerequisites for monetary policy. We found that a unique REE that is least
squares learnable often is the outcome when there is a limited amount of
trend following, but that a less ﬂexible inﬂation rate targeting may cause a
multiplicity of REE. We also computed impulse-response functions for key
variables to study how the economy returns to steady state after being hit by
as h o c k .
Making the fractions of the two types of behavior in currency trade
endogenous would, of course, be an interesting complement to this paper,
and a setup similar to the one in Brock and Hommes (1997) could be used
for this aim: (i) fundamental analysis is costly to use; and (ii) most traders
use the trading strategy that has been more successful to predict exchange
rate movements. In Bask (2007b), this setup is also used in a DSGE model in
which the central bank is using a Taylor rule in policy-making with the result
that chaotic dynamics and long swings may be present in the exchange rate.
The implementation of an optimal policy rule in a similar setting is, therefore,
part of future research.
22References
Bask, M (2006) Announcement Eﬀects on Exchange Rate Movements:
Continuity as a Selection Criterion among the REE. Bank of Finland
Research Discussion Paper 6/2006.
Bask, M (2007a) Chartism and Exchange Rate Volatility. International
Journal of Finance and Economics, 12, 301—316.
Bask, M (2007b) Long Swings and Chaos in the Exchange Rate in
aD S G EM o d e lw i t haT a y l o rR u l e .Forthcoming in Bank of Finland
Research Discussion Papers.
Blanchard, O J — Kahn, C M (1980) The Solution of Linear Diﬀerence
Models under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 48, 1305—1311.
Brock, W A — Hommes, C H (1997) A Rational Route to Randomness.
Econometrica, 65, 1059—1095.
Bullard, J B (2006) The Learnability Criterion and Monetary Policy.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 88 (3), 203—217.
Bullard, J B — Schaling, E (2006) Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and
Learnability in the Open Economy. ECB Working Paper No. 611.
Calvo, G A (1983) Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing
Framework. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383—398.
Cheung, Y-W — Chinn, M D (2001) Currency Traders and Exchange Rate
Dynamics: A Survey of the US Market. Journal of International Money
and Finance, 20, 439—471.
Clarida, R — Galí, J — Gertler, M (1999) The Science of Monetary
Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature,
37, 1661—1707.
Clarida, R — Galí, J — Gertler, M (2000) Monetary Policy Rules and
Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 147—180.
Clarida, R — Galí, J — Gertler, M (2001) Optimal Monetary Policy in
Open versus Closed Economies: An Integrated Approach. American
Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings), 91, 248—252.
De Grauwe, P — Grimaldi, M (2006) T h eE x c h a n g eR a t ei naB e h a v i o r a l
Finance Framework. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Evans, G W — Honkapohja, S (2001) Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Evans, G W — Honkapohja, S (2003a) Adaptive Learning and Monetary
Policy Design. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 1045—1072.
23Evans, G W — Honkapohja, S (2003b) Expectations and the Stability
Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies. Review of Economic Studies,
70, 807—824.
Evans, G W — Honkapohja, S (2003c) Friedman’s Money Supply Rule vs.
Optimal Interest Rate Policy. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 50,
550—566.
Evans, G W — Honkapohja, S (2006) Monetary Policy, Expectations and
Commitment. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, 15—38.
Galí, J — Monacelli, T (2005) Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate
Volatility in a Small Open Economy. Review of Economic Studies, 72,
707—734.
Gehrig, T — Menkhoﬀ, L (2006) Extended Evidence on the Use of
Technical Analysis in Foreign Exchange. International Journal of Finance
and Economics, 11, 327—338.
Hommes, C H (2006) Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and
Finance. In Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. 2: Agent-Based
Computational Economics by Tesfatsion, L and Judd, K L (eds.),
Elsevier/North-Holland.
Llosa, G — Tuesta, V (2006) Determinacy and Learnability of Monetary
Policy Rules in Small Open Economies. Inter-American Development
Bank Working Paper No. 576.
Lui, Y-H — Mole, D (1998) The Use of Fundamental and Technical
Analyses by Foreign Exchange Dealers: Hong Kong Evidence. Journal
of International Money and Finance, 17, 535—545.
McCallum, B T (2007) E-Stability vis-a-vis Determinacy Results for
a Broad Class of Linear Rational Expectations Models. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 1376—1391.
Menkhoﬀ, L (1997) Examining the Use of Technical Currency Analysis.
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2, 307—318.
Neely, C J (1997) Technical Analysis in the Foreign Exchange Market:
A Layman’s Guide. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 79 (5), 23—38.
Oberlechner, T (2001) Importance of Technical and Fundamental
Analysis in the European Foreign Exchange Market. International
Journal of Finance and Economics, 6, 81—93.
Oberlechner, T (2004) The Psychology of the Foreign Exchange Market.
West Sussex, England: Wiley.
Svensson, L E O (2002) Inﬂation Targeting: Should it be Modeled as
an Instrument Rule or a Targeting Rule? European Economic Review,
46, 771—780.
24Svensson, L E O (2003) What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using
Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules. Journal of
Economic Literature, 41, 426—477.
Taylor, J B (1993) Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195—214.
Taylor, J B (1999) A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules. In
Monetary Policy Rules by Taylor, J B (ed.), Chicago, Illinois: University of
Chicago Press.
Taylor, M P — Allen, H (1992) The Use of Technical Analysis in the
Foreign Exchange Market. Journal of International Money and Finance,
11, 304—314.
Woodford, M (1999) Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia. NBER Working
Paper No. 7261.
Woodford, M (2003) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Zimmermann, G (2003) Optimal Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian
View. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 6, 61—72.
25Appendix
Derivation of (2.1)—(2.2)
The Galí and Monacelli (2005) model can after extensive derivations be reduced











where πH,t is the domestic inﬂation rate. However, (A.1) is not in an
appropriate form since there are no expected exchange rate terms in the
equations, which is necessary when incorporating diﬀerent behaviors in
currency trade. Fortunately, it is possible to use the following equations, which
are derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005), to rewrite (A.1) into a suitable form
½
πt = πH,t + δ∆st
st = et + p∗
t − pH,t
(A.2)
where st is the terms of trade, p∗
t is the index of foreign goods prices, and pH,t
is the index of domestic goods prices. Firstly, shift the ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni n( A . 2 )

















































· (πt − δ(∆et + π
∗
t)) (A.6)
Fifthly, substitute (A.5) into the ﬁrst equation in (A.1), and (2.1) is derived.
Finally, substitute (A.5)—(A.6) into the second equation in (A.1), solve for πt,
and (2.2) is derived.
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